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a b s t r a c t
We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy
people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases
contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The US is regularly experiencing a lively debate on whether
estate tax is good for the economy or not. This debate has been
revived recently by the implication of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 that resulted in a unique situation:
there was no estate tax for the year 2010. The proponents of estate
tax believe that estate tax essentially prevents the formation of
a royalty, while also helping to bridge the disparities in wealth.
Supporters of estate tax include billionaires like Warren Buffet
and Bill Gates who, along with 2000 wealthy Americans, have
signed up for Responsible Wealth, a project of United for a Fair
Economy (2011) to advocate reinstating the estate tax in 2011.1
Opponents of the estate tax call it death tax because they feel
that the government is in effect penalizing death.2 They argue that
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E-mail address: p.pestieau@ulg.ac.be (P. Pestieau).
1 ResponsibleWealth, a project of United for a Fair Economy (2011), is a network
of over 700 business leaders andwealthy individuals in the top 5% of income and/or
wealth in the USwho use their surprising voice to advocate fair taxes and corporate
accountability.
2 For a survey of the arguments pro and con estate taxation, see Cremer and
Pestieau (2011).
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doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.101estate tax is double taxation since the wealth was already taxed
during its creation as income tax or some other tax. Among the
opponents one finds a lot of people who cannot be hurt by estate
taxation: they will not pay it like a huge majority of Americans
and thus they can only benefit from its proceeds.3 To sum up,
this highly stylized view suggests that very rich individuals often
support bequest taxation while middle class and poor individuals
oppose it (even though they – or their heirs – may effectively pay
no or very little tax on bequests).
This note provides a possible explanation for such a paradoxical
situation. This explanation is based on the taste of wealthy
individuals for contributing to awide array of charities that benefit
from tax breaks. Given the public good nature of charities their
supply through contributions is known to be suboptimal.4 Thus
tax breaks, by fostering contributions, can have social benefits that
exceed their fiscal cost. As for the wealthless individuals they are
less attracted by charitable donations; hence, whether or not they
support estate taxation will depend on its redistributiveness. If
the tax obeys the benefit tax principle (i.e., equivalence between
contributions and benefits), they will be at best indifferent.
3 Prabhakar (unpublished) discusses the various reasonswhy the ‘‘death tax’’ gets
so little political support.
4 A survey on charities is provided by Andreoni (2006). On the issue if private
provision of public goods, see Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Andreoni (1988).
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homogenous groups of individuals. In the first, individuals have an
initial endowment that they allocate between a composite good,
donation to a charity and bequests. In the second, individuals
have a lower endowment that is allocated between the composite
good and bequests. Taxing bequests amounts to subsidizing both
the composite good and charitable contributions. Such a tax thus
fosters contributions (which are otherwise too low in the Nash
equilibrium). When the tax proceeds are returned to those who
pay the tax, one can expect Group 1 to benefit from the tax and
Group 2 to be penalized by it. However, when tax proceeds are
used to finance a transfer towards Group 2, that group no longer
necessarily looses. As amatter of fact, wewill show that depending
on the parameters of the model it may (or may not) be possible to
design a transfer scheme thatwouldmake everyone better off than
in the absence of estate taxation.
It is clear that this model could be generalized to reflect real
life complexities. Our objective is rather modest. Wewant to show
why wealthy contributors can be in favor of a tax which a priori
is supposed to burden them and why it is possible to have a
unanimity of individuals in favor of the estate tax.
The rest of the letter is organized as follows. We first look at
these two groups as if they were autarkic. And then we look at the
overall tax problem.
2. Group 1: the contributors
Each member of the first group, that of contributors, has an
income y and a utility U(x, b,G) where x is a composite good, b
is bequest and G is a charity (a pure public good). The size of this
group is n. The utility of a contributor is given by
U(x, b,G) = G+ u(x)+ u(b). (1)
The quasi-linear utility is adopted tomake our point in the simplest
possible way. It implies no income effect on the demand for either
x or b. We now consider different types of solution assuming for
the time being that the entire population belongs to Group 1.
2.1. First-best
Assuming that equal individuals are treated identically, we
define the first-best as the feasible allocation that maximizes the
utility of a representative individual. The Lagrangian expression
associated with this problem is given by
L1 = G+ u(x)+ u(b)− µ (G/n+ x+ b− y) ,
where µ is the multiplier of the resource constraint. Recall that G
is a public and, hence, nonrival good. Differentiating with respect
to G, x and b and rearranging yields the following first-order
conditions (hereafter FOC):
u′(x) = u′(b) = n = µ. (2)
When u(·) = ln(·), Eq. (2) simplifies to x = b = 1/n. Combining
this condition with the resource constraint yields G = ny− 2.
2.2. Laissez-faire
Each individual chooses the contribution g ≥ 0 and the bequest
b that maximize utility given by
G−1 + y− b− x+ u(x)+ u(b),
where G−1 denotes the sum of the contributions of the n− 1 other
individuals. In other words, we determine the symmetric Nashequilibrium of the public good contribution game. This yields the
FOC
u′(x) = u′(b) = 1.
With u(·) = ln(·), we have x = b = 1. Hence, G = ny −
2n.5 Because charity is a public good, the Nash equilibrium level
of provision is too low. The difference between equilibrium and
optimal level increases with the size of Group 1.
2.3. Constrained first-best (x = 1) and its decentralization as second-
best
We now consider a constrained first-best, where x takes its
laissez-faire value. This allocation is a relevant benchmark because
we assume that there is no tax (or subsidy) on x. With quasi-linear
preferences the level of x will then remain at x = x¯ = 1, even
when there are taxes on the other goods and/or lump sum transfers
(there is no income effect).
The problem is now to choose g and b that maximize
G+ u(x¯)+ u(b)− µ (G/n+ x¯+ b− y) .
The FOC leads to:
u′(b) = n.
With the log example: b = 1/n and G = ny− 1− n.
The above constrained first-best can be achieved with the use
of a tax on bequests, σ , and a lump-sum transfer T . Facedwith such
instruments, Group 1 members solve
max
x,b
G−1 + y− b(1+ σ)− x+ T + u(x)+ u(b),
leading to the FOC
−(1+ σ)+ u′(b) = 0.
With the log example it is sufficient to set σ = n − 1 and T =
σb = (n − 1)/n to achieve the second-best optimum (recall that
b = 1/n).
2.4. Utility gain
Let us nowmeasure themaximumutility gain one obtains from
moving from the laissez-faire to this second-best. We have
ULF = ny− 2n+ 2 ln 1,
USB = ny− 1− n+ ln 1− ln n,
so that
∆ ≡ USB − ULF = n− 1− ln n. (3)
Observe that ∆ > 0 as long as n > 1. It thus appears from this
example that a tax on bequests is welfare improving for Group 1.
This is because it induces each individual to contributemore to the
public good. Recall that the contribution equilibrium implies a level
of public good that is too low. Further observe that the (per capita)
welfare gain increases in the group size:
∂∆
∂n
= 1− 1
n
> 0 for n > 1.
This does not come as a surprise, as we have shown in Section 2.2
that the inefficiency of the public good provision (the difference
between optimal and equilibrium level) increases with the group
size.
3. Group 2
In the second group, which is of size m, each individual has an
incomew and a utility.
U2(x, b) = u(x)+ βu(b).
5 The income level y is assumed to be larger than 2, in order to have an interior
solution.
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good provided through the charitable contributions and theweight
put on the bequest termmay differ from the other group.We show
that depending on how the proceeds of the tax are distributed
between the two groups, one can have a tax that is supported by
the two groups, or by just one. The relative size of n andm and that
of y andw will also matter.
Let A2 denote the lump-sum transfer received by a member
of Group 2, which is given by A2 ≡ T2 + θ , where T2 = σb2
represents the proceeds of the bequest tax tax (in Group 2 and in
per capita terms), while θ is a transfer from Group 1. Returning to
the logarithmic specification, we have
U2 = ln[w − (1+ σ)b+ A] + β ln b.
This gives from the FOC
b = β
1+ β + σ (w + θ)
and the indirect utility
V2(σ , θ) = ln

1
1+ β + σ (w + θ) (1+ σ)

+β ln

β
1+ β + σ (w + θ)

which can be rewritten as
V2 (σ , θ) = (1+ β) ln (w + θ)− (1+ β) ln (1+ β + σ)
+ ln(1+ σ)+ (1+ β) lnβ.
We have
V2 (0, 0) = (1+ β) lnw − (1+ β) ln (1+ β)+ ln 1+ β lnβ,
and
V2 (σ , 0) = (1+ β) lnw − (1+ β) ln (1+ β + σ)
+ ln(1+ σ)+ β lnβ.
Differentiating this expression with respect to the bequest tax rate
yields
∂V2(σ , 0)
∂σ
= − 1+ β
1+ β + σ +
1
1+ σ < 0,
as long a β > 0. The sign of this expression does not come
as a surprise. Since the member of this group do not care for
the public good, a bequest tax is simply a commodity tax (on
identical individuals) whose proceeds are distributed in a lump-
sum way. Because of the deadweight loss, this tax decreases
welfare. Consequently we have V2 (σ , 0) < V2 (0, 0). However,
as θ increases (when there is a transfer from the other group),
the impact on Group 2’s welfare becomes ambiguous and we have
V2 (σ , θ) ≶ V2 (0, 0).
4. Both groups
So far we have considered the two groups separately. We now
consider the entire economyand examine if the level of the transfer
θ can be chosen in a way that the policy increases the welfare of
both groups. From Section 2we have an expression for∆ the utility
gain of each member of Group 1. Given that∆ is in utility terms, it
should be divided by n to convert it into monetary units (to obtain
the compensating variation).6Consequently,
θ = n∆/nm = ∆/m (4)
6 Recall that the utility function specified by (1) is linear in the public good G.
Consequently an individual’s marginal utility of income is constant and equal to n.Table 1
Level of D as a function of β andm.
m 1 5 10 50 100 1000
β
0.01 2.047 0.84 0.504 0.113 0.515 −0.007
0.1 2.108 0.798 0.427 0.002 −0.065 −0.129
0.5 2.445 0.658 0.153 −0.427 −0.519 −0.606
0.9 2.86 0.598 −0.042 −0.777 −0.893 −1.004
is the maximum monetary transfer individuals of Group 2 can
receive (while ensuring that Group 1 is not worse off than without
the policy). The question we are left with is whether or not this
transfer θ along with σ = n − 1 may lead to an increase in the
welfare of Group 2.
There will be a welfare improvement if
D = V2(σ , θ)− V2(0, 0)
= [V2(σ , θ)− V2(σ , 0)]− [V2(0, 0)− V2(σ , 0)] > 0. (5)
The second term in brackets is positive and corresponds to the
deadweight loss of the tax. The first term in brackets is positive
and increases with θ . It follows that there exists a value of θ(σ ), θˆ
such that D = 0. The question is then to know whether the
level of θ defined by (4) and (3) is sufficiently large to pass this
test. To tackle this question, we resort to a numerical example
with logarithmic utility and different values for both β and m.
Table 1 reports the implied values of D.7 It confirms that there
exist values of these two parameters that are compatible with
a positive value of D. Not surprisingly this occurs when β and
m are not too large. It thus appears that estate taxation can be
supported by both the contributors and the non contributors when
it generates a sufficiently significant surplus to the first by fostering
contributions to charitable causes. The condition is that this
surplus be large enough to compensate Group 2 for the deadweight
loss of the tax. When this condition is met there exists room for
a potential Pareto improvement. Quite clearly, to achieve a Pareto
improvement, the transfer then must be effectively implemented.
5. Conclusion
This paper has provided a simple illustrative model that can
account for the fact that very rich people often support bequest
taxes, whilemiddle class or poor individuals oppose it. The bequest
tax may improve the welfare of the rich because it stimulates
contributions to a charity (a public good) which is provided
through voluntary donations.Middle class individuals, on the other
hand, do not care about the charity and loose from the estate tax
even when its proceeds are refunded in a lump sum way (because
of the deadweight loss). Furthermore we show that as system of
inter-group transfersmay ormay not be sufficient to overcome the
opposition of the middle class individuals. Not surprisingly, such
transfers can effectively be designed (and a Pareto improvement
achieved) when the utility weight of bequests within Group 2 as
well as the relative size of the group are not too large.
Our model is admittedly highly stylized and is only remotely
related to reality. However, it is intended to illustrate in a simple
way one of the factors that affects political support for bequest
taxation (or the lack of such a support). We do not claim that it is
the only factor nor for that matter necessarily the most significant
one. Still it offers a simple explanation for seemingly paradoxical
stylized fact. Concern for charities is not the only reasonwhy some
7 In this simulation, we set w = 1 and n = 10. The lines of the table indicate
values for β and the columns correspond tom.
426 G. Casamatta et al. / Economics Letters 115 (2012) 423–426wealthy people are in favor of taxation of bequests. Other motives
are sometimes invoked like a feeling of gratefulness for a society
which has rewarded them so much or the conviction that leaving
toomuch undeservedmoney to their children can be harmful.8 But
these considerations are outside the scope of economics.
References
Andreoni, J., 1988. Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits
of altruism. Journal of Public Economics 35, 57–73.
8 In that respect, one may note that as opposed to the dynastic wealthy (such
as Rockefeller), the new wealthy such as Bill gates tend to be more vocal in their
support for estate taxation.Andreoni, J., 2006. Philanthropy. In: Kolm, S.Ch., Mercier Ythier, J. (Eds.), Handbook
of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, vol. 1. Elsevier North Holland, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands.
Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., Varian, H., 1986. On the private provision of public goods.
Journal of Public Economics 29, 25–49.
Cremer, H., Pestieau, P., 2011. Taxing wealth and wealth transfers. A survey.
In: Albi, E., Martinez-Vazquez, J. (Eds.), The Elgar Guide to Tax Systems. Edward
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK.
Prabhakar, R., 2010. Debating the death tax: the politics of inheritance tax in the UK,
LSE, London (unpublished).
United for a Fair Economy (2011), New estate tax bill taxes the 1% to benefit
the 99%, http://faireconomy.org/enews/new_estate_tax_bill_taxes_the_1_to_
benefit_the_99.
